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1. Introduction 
As the wave of litigation by alleged victims of clergy sexual 
misconduct against the Catholic Church made its way through the 
judicial system at the turn of the new century, one diocese after 
another began hinting that it might respond by filing for 
bankruptcy. In 2004, the dam burst. The Boston Archdiocese, the 
diocese that seemed most likely to end up in bankruptcy, resolved 
its litigation through a global settlement. But the Archdiocese of 
Portland did not, and on July 6, it filed for Chapter 11. vVithin a 
few months, Portland was joined by two more dioceses, Tucson 
and Spokane.1 
* S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. I am grateful to Seth Chertok and Yang Liu for research assistance and to 
Jonathan Lipson and to the participants at the "Bankruptcy in the Religious Non­
Profit Context" conference at Seton Hall University School of Law on November 5, 
2004, for helpful comments. 
) See, e.g., Matt Miller, 17w Church and ChajJter 11, DAILY DEAL, Aug. 6, 2004 
(discussing Portland diocesan bankruptcy filing and noting that Boston Archdiocese 
settled with 552 claimants in September 2003) [hereinafter Miller I]; Larry B. 
Stammer, 01oegon Diocese }'irst to File Bankruptc)l, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at Al 
(Portland filing); Matt Miller, Tucson Diocese Details Prepach, DAlLY DEAL, Sept. 22, 
2004 (Tucson diocesan filing September 20, 2004) [hereinafter Miller II]. In the 
345 
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The filings sent bankruptcy lawyers and scholars scrambling 
for their pocket Bankruptcy Codes. As it turns out, they needn't 
have bothered, at least if they were looking for explicit guidance 
on church bankruptcy. The word "church" is nowhere to be 
found in Chapter 11 or any other corner of the bankruptcy laws. 
To use the cliche that seemed to crop up in every discussion, 
church bankruptcy is uncharted waters for a bankruptcy process 
that is designed with ordinary businesses in mind.2 
Of particular concern was the danger that the bankruptcy 
laws, which provide for extensive oversight of the debtor's 
finances, might interfere with the religious affairs of the church, 
thus running afoul of the First Amendment guarantee of free 
exercise of religion. It isn't often that bankruptcy experts and 
constitutional law scholars participate in the same conversations. 
But the church bankruptcies have religious freedom experts using 
terms like "property of the estate," and bankruptcy experts 
puzzling over "deference" and "neutral principles" as they attempt 
to chart the lines between the Chapter 11 reorganization 
framework and the church's ministries and religious mission. 
This article focuses on the three contexts where the tension 
between free exercise and the bankruptcy process comes most 
clearly to the fore.:1 To try to make sense of these issues, I will 
analogize the church bankruptcy cases to two other entities that 
may seem at first glance to have little in common with churches: 
municipalities and sovereign nations. The common theme is this: 
With municipalities and sovereign nations, as with religious 
entities, bankruptcy oversight creates tensions that can be loosely 
described as "sovereignty concerns." 
The similarities between church and municipality bankruptcy 
- which is governed by Chapter 9,  a special set of provisions 
designed specifically for municipalities - are particularly striking.' 
Indeed, I suspect that if the drafters of the bankruptcy laws had 
months since this Article was written, the Tuscon diocese has confirmed a consensual 
reorganization plan in July 2005. The Portland and Spokane cases are still in 
Chapter 11. 
� See, e.g., Miller I, supra note 1 (quoting Msgr. Thomas Cahalane). 
:1 In an earlier article, I explored the question whether it is appropriate for 
churches to file for bankruptcy, and what obstacles a church might face. David A. 
Skeel,Jr., Avoiding iVIoral Bankruptcy, 44 B.G. L REv. 1181 (2003 ). 
i 11 U.S.G.§901 etseq. (2005). 
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envisioned the possibility of a church bankruptcy filing, they 
would have either included religious organizations within Chapter 
9 or adopted an analogous set of provisions for religious 
organizations. VVnile sovereign bankruptcy is theory rather than 
fact, the International Monetary Fund and some commentators 
have called for such a framework in recent years." Many of the 
issues that have been debated in the sovereign debt context closely 
parallel the religious freedom issues that arise in a church 
bankruptcy. A key concern, for instance, is that any sovereign 
bankruptcy regime not interfere with the sovereign's internal 
decision making. 
The Article proceeds as follows. I begin, in Part II, by 
considering the much debated question of what property comes 
into the bankruptcy "estate" when a diocese files for Chapter 1l." 
The most pressing issue is whether the churches, schools, and 
other property in a diocese should be treated as diocesan 
property, or whether they belong to the local parish or 
parishioners and are thus off limits to creditors in a diocesan 
bankruptcy. Part III considers whether bankruptcy's disclosure 
and oversight rules are likely to interfere with a church's free 
exercise rights. Finally, Part IV addresses several confirmation 
issues - issues that arise when the church debtor seeks to confirm 
a reorganization plan. Here, a particularly tricky question is 
whether a church debtor can use the so-called cramdown 
provisions, and confirm a reorganization plan over the objections 
of the clergy misconduct victims if negotiations with the victims 
break down.' 
To- paraphrase the line generations of law students have been 
tempted to use each time they answer an exam question, these are 
difficult issues that do not admit of a simple answer. With each of 
the issues, I will offer my own conclusions as to the best resolution. 
But I will also suggest that the best strategy for a bankruptcy judge 
For discussion of the IMF proposal and other proposed sovereign bankruptcy 
regimes, see for example, Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Private Sector 
Involvement in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A New Role for the IMF? (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author);, Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A Hist01) of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 lMF 
STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002). 
6 Property of the estate is governed by 11 U.S. C. § 541. 
i The cramdowl1 provisions are set forth in 11 U.S. C. § 1] 29 (b) . 
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may be to finesse several of the issues, and to prod the parties to 
reach a consensual agreement on the terms of the reorganization 
plan. 
II. Who Owns the Property? 
When a sovereign nation or a municipality cannot pay its 
obligations, much of its property is off limits to creditors. With 
sovereign debtors, sovereign immunity keeps creditors' hands off 
property within the sovereign's boundaries.' The laws of most U.S. 
states achieve a similar effect for municipalities. Although 
municipalities do not enjoy absolute protection, property used for 
governmental operations is immune from creditors.9 
Church property is treated much more like the property held 
by private businesses. Unlike with sovereign debtors or 
municipalities, the foreclosure rules generally do not provide 
special protections for churches. III Sovereignty issues do not 
disappear in the church property context, however. Sovereign-ty ­
in the form of religious freedom concerns - comes into play when 
courts are asked to determine which church entity should be seen 
as owning the church's property. If a local church wishes to jump 
ship from its denomination, does the local church or the 
denomination own the church building/ Answering these 
questions has forced courts to negotiate the line between resolving 
ordinary property disputes and interfering with a church's 
X See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should A 
Sovereign BankruptlY Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY LJ. 762, 781-82 (2004) 
(immunity of sovereign assets from seizllre). 
l) See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Co Broke: A 
ConcetJ/llal Introduction to j'vlunicij)a/ Bankru/Jtcy, 60 U. CHI. L. RE\'. 425, 429-34 (1993) 
(limitations on seizure of municipal property). 
III For an old case that underscores this point, and at the same time suggests a 
reluctance to allow a foreclosure, see J'vlannix v. Purcell, 19 N.E. 572 (Ohio 1 8S8) 
(preventing creditors from foreclosing on church assets to satisry personal creditors 
of the bishop). Thanks to Jonathan Lipson for bringing this case to my attention. 
II The case law on these church property disputes is surveyed and analyzed in 
detail in Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious 
01ganizations, 39 AM. U. L. RE\·. 513 (1990). After this Article was drafted, and shortly 
before it went to press, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Washington issued a ruling on the property issue in the Spokane case. The decision, 
which is being appealed, reaches very similar conclusions to those argued for in this 
part. In Ie Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005) 
(holding that the church's real property is part of the bankruptcy estate). 
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internal religious functions. 
Ownership issues have figured prominently in the recent 
church bankruptcies (and near bankruptcies), and their 
resolution remains subject to fien:e dispute. A key question in 
each of the cases is this: Are the cathedrals and schools in a 
diocese owned by the diocese, the parish, the local parishioners, 
or someone else? To understand the dispute, we should begin by 
briefly considering the ownership of church assets under church 
and secular law. 
In the nineteenth century, faced with the ticklish question of 
how religious organizations should be recognized in the secular 
law, many states passed statutes creating the corporate form 
known as a corporation sole. I� A corporation sole is a person - in 
this case the bishop - and his or her successors, who are treated in 
much the same way as a secular corporation.n Many Catholic 
dioceses are set up as a corporation sole. In some dioceses, the 
parishes within the diocese are incorporated separately as non­
profit corporations. In others, the parishes have not been housed 
• • 11 
111 separate corporatIOns. 
In dioceses whose parishes have not been separately 
incorporated, the basic ownership structure seems to suggest that 
the churches, schools, and other property are owned by diocese. 
But church officials have argued, under both canon and secular 
law, that this appearance is mistaken. First, according to one 
argument, which draws on both canon and secular law, church 
property is held in trust for the parishioners of the parish where it 
is located. On this view, the bishop is the trustee of a trust, but 
ownership is vested in the parishioners, as beneficiaries. I; A 
I� See, e.g., Miller I, s'UjJm note 1 ("Religious historians trace corporation sole to 
the early 19th century."). 
13 For a representative corporate sole statute, see UTAH Dr\'. Of CORJ)S. AND 
COMMERCIA:L CODE, CORPORATION SOLE: How To INCORPORATE (2002) (on file with 
author) . 
Ii See, e.g., Miller 1, s'UjJ1a note I (noting that Portland parishes are not separately 
incorporated, whereas in 2003 "the eastern Oregon diocese of Baker transferred 
parish properties from a corporation sole to more than 60 separate corporations 
held by boards of trustees"). 
Ij Ie!. ("The church steadfastly maintains that while parish property is held in the 
name of the office of a bishop or archbishop, it is a trust relationship. That is 
codified in canon law. As a result, the church says, parish property should be 
excluded from an inventory of assets."). 
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second argument is that canon law requires that church property 
be held at the parish level, rather than at the diocesan level. 
Under this view, the true owners of the property are the parishes, 
rather than the diocese or the parishioners. 
How should these conflicting interpretations be resolved? 
Start with the nonbankruptcy analysis of the trust issue. Under the 
leading Supreme Court case, Jones v. Wolf, I.; states can adopt and 
courts apply a "neutral principles" approach to property issues 
that implicate both state and religious law. If property ownership 
can be determined without interpreting religious doctrine, courts 
are permitted to wade in; otherwise, the issue must be left to 
church officials. In the church property cases, a key question is 
whether to recognize the existence of a trust. If the trust relations 
are set out explicitly, the arrangement may qualify as an express 
trust under secular law. With most dioceses, this level of formality 
does not seem to be present, though in some cases it may be. In 
the absence of an express trust, it is possible that a court would 
find an implied trust running from the bishop to the_ parishes or 
parishioners, although here too the answer is unclear.l• 
Now turn to bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law generally goes to 
great lengths to replicate the nonbankruptcy treatment of 
property law issues. Section 541, which determines what property 
becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, is designed to brin& in 
everything that the debtor owns and nothing that it does not. ' If 
the debtor owns a partial interest in property, for instance, the 
partial interest becomes property of the estate but the remainder 
does not. Of particular relevance for our purposes, § 541 
Iii 443 O.S. 595 (1979). In the Spokane case, the court noted that "Washington 
uses the "compulsory deference" approach rather than neutral principles, but 
concluded that, because the bankruptcy property issue is n'ot an intra-church 
dispute, a similar analysis applies. In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 323 
(concluding that "the First Amendment does not prevent application of a law or 
body of law which is facially neutral and generally applied in the jurisdiction to a 
religious organization") . 
Ii A trial court concluded that the Boston archdiocese's ownership rights were 
not subject to an implied trust. Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 2004 Mass. 
Super. LEXIS 349, *7 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Sept. 14,2004) ("There is simply no evidence 
here to warrant a finding of a resulting trust in real estate."). For a discussion of the 
implied trust issue, see Gerstenblith, S1tjJ)"{t note 11, at 550-66. 
IX Under 11 U.s.C. § 541 (a) (1), "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case" are treated as part of the "estate." 
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'specifically states that only the debtor's legal title, not any 
equitable interest in property , becomes part of the estate if legal 
title is all that the debtor holds.
19 
Thus, if a diocesan debtor holds 
legal title to a church or school as the trustee of a trust , with the 
beneficial interests belonging to the parishes or parishioners ,  only 
the bare legal title would come into the estate. 
This initial determination does not end the analysis , however. 
There is more to the story. The trustee (or debtor-in-possession) 
is given the power to augment the estate by retrieving preferential 
pre-bankruptcy payments and avoiding some interests that might 
be recognized outside of bankruptcy. Of particular relevance is § 
544(a) (3), which permits the trustee to eliminate any interest that 
could be voided by "a bona fide purchaser of real property. 
,,211 
The 
language is confusing , but the concept is simple: The trustee can 
eliminate any property interest that would have been trumped 
outside of bankruptcy by a sale to a bona fide purchaser. 
This issue comes into play with church bankruptcies in 
connection with the argument that diocesan property is held in an 
implied or constructive trust for the parishes or parishioners. 
Would a constructive trust be trumped by a sale to a bona fide 
purchaser? The answer seems to be yes. "Under most states' 
laws ," as Judge Easterbrook puts it in a leading case, "the buyer in 
good faith of real property can obtain a position superior to that of 
the rightful owner, if the owner neglected to record his interest in 
the filing system. Section 544(a) (3) gives the trustee the same sort 
of position. 
,,21 
When we import Easterbrook's reasoning, which arose in an 
ordinary bankruptcy case, into the church context, it may initially 
seem to raise church-state concerns. The Bankruptcy Code seems 
to override the teaching of the church as to how property should 
be held. But the conflict is more illusory than real. It is quite 
simple for the church to set up an explicit trust arrangement,  or 
to separately incorporate the parishes within a diocese and vest 
title in the parishes where the churches or schools are located. If 
a church has not taken these steps , by contrast, finding an implied 
trust to have existed and then honoring it in bankruptcy would be 
19Id, § 541(d), 
211 Id, § 544(a) (3). 
21 Belisle v, Plunkett, 877 F,2d 512 (7th CiL 1989), 
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a recipe for trouble. It would "obfuscate land titles and [] make 
real estate transactions more complex and costly," as one 
commentator puts it, since potential purchasers might have no 
idea that the property was subject to an implied trust, even if they 
diligently searched the real estate records.
�� 
Thus far, I have treated the property ownership issue as a 
doctrinal question, but there is a more practical point as well. The 
best solution to the property question may be for the bankruptcy 
court to avoid resolving it. Chapter 11 is designed to be a 
negotiated process, and everyone may be better off if the parties 
devise a reorganization plan that finesses the question of whether 
the diocese owns the property. From the diocesan debtor's 
perspective, resolving the question could put it in the awkward 
position of arguing in the bankruptcy court that it doesn't own the 
property, but then later wishing to switch sides and act as if the 
diocese does own the property if the time comes to shut down or 
sell a church or school. Indeed, the dilemma is not simply 
hypothetical. Mter suggesting several years ago that its property is 
held in trust for its parishioners, the Boston Archdiocese has 
recently argued that it has the authority to close and possibly sell a 
number of churches in the Archdiocese.
�\ 
The victims and their 
lawyers face a much simpler dilemma. If the issue is resolved and 
the court concludes that the local churches and schools are not 
owned by the diocese, the assets available for corhpensating the 
victims will be sharply reduced. 
In short, there is a lot to be said for deciding not to decide 
the question of who owns the churches and schools in a diocese. 
But if the court does wade into these waters, and the state where 
the property is located follows the neutral principles approach, 
the issue can be resolved the same way it would be resolved if the 
property were held by a private business , without runnmg 
aground on church-state concerns. 
�2 Gerstenblith, supra note 1 1 ,  at 566. 
2:\ See AkowJ, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 349, at *9 (refusing to grant preliminary 
injunction that would have enjoined archdiocese from closi ng their parish church). 
Catharine Wells discusses the archdiocese's conflicting incentives in detail in her 
contribution to this symposium. Catharine Pierce Wells, vVho Owns the Local Church? 
A Pressing Issue for Dioceses in Bankruptcy, 29 SET001 HALL LEGIS. J. 375 (2005). 
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Ill. Bankruptcy Court Scrutiny and Intervention in Church Decision 
Making 
353 
A second sovereignty-related concern is the danger that the 
bankruptcy process may interfere with sovereign decision making. 
Chapter 9, the provisions that govern municipal bankruptcy in the 
U.S., explicitly addresses this concern by precluding the court 
from "interfer [ingJ with . . .  any of the political or governmental 
powers of the debtor. 
,,21 
The sovereign bankruptcy proposals that 
have been debated in recent years also take these concerns into 
account by attempting to minimize the amount of interference 
with sovereign decision making.
�-' ,,,lith church bankruptcies, by 
con trast, the Bankruptcy Code does not make any special 
concessions to church decision making.
21; This leaves the First 
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as the 
principal bulwarks agaInst bankruptcy court interference with 
church functions.�' 
The potential friction betw-een the bankruptcy process and 
sovereign decision making comes in three areas. The first is the 
pervasive bankruptcy oversight of a debtor that files for 
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy requires extensive disclosure, and it 
provides sweeping access to a debtor's officers and its financial 
records.�' As intrusive as this oversight is, however, it does not 
seem likely to interfere with church decision making in any 
constitutionally impermissible way. Since bankruptcy is a privilege 
rather than a right, a church that files for bankruptcy should be 
viewed as inviting a certain amount of scrutiny of its financial 
�; 11 U.S.C § 904(1). 
�j See, e_g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN OF THE Sm·EREIG:-.J DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING MECH.'\NISM - FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS, at 7 (Nov. 27, 2002), 
availablf at http://w w-1rnf.org/extemal/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf (listing, 
as one of the principles guiding tbe IMF's proposed framework, that the "mechanism 
should not interfere with the sovereignty of debtors"). 
21i I have speculated elsewhere that this is probably an accident. The drafters of 
the Bankruptcy Code do not seem to have contemplated the possibility that a church 
might file for bankruptcy- Skeel, sujJ/U note 3, at 1194_ 
2; US CONST. amend. I; Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 USC. § 2000bb 
(1994) . 
2� See, e.g., 11 USC § 521 (1) (requiring debtor to file list of creditors and 
statement of assets and liabilities); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004_ 
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affairs.
�" 
The second source of friction is more dramatic. Although the 
bankruptcy laws assume that the debtor's existing managers - in 
this case the bishop or other church leaders - will continue to run 
its financial operations in Chapter 11, creditors are entitled to ask 
the court to appoint a trustee.
�L 
In a church bankruptcy, 
appointment of a trustee would mean wresting control over the 
diocese's churches and schools from church officials, and putting 
it in the hands of a private, secular decision maker. Just as it is 
hard to imagine a sovereign or municipal bankruptcy regime that 
purported to dictate political decisions, it is almost inconceivable 
that a court would attempt to displace church decision makers in 
favor of a trustee. I add the qualifier "almost" because at least one 
California court attempted to do essentially the same thing, 
appointing a receiver under state law to take over for officials of a 
church whose officers had been accused of malfeasance. The 
legislature stepped in and passed a statute that effectively 
overturned the order, however, and a California appellate court 
suggested in dicta that the receivership was probably 
unconstitutional.
H 
The final friction is the trickiest, since it is much more 
intrusive than bankruptcy's disclosure obligations but less 
draconian than appointing a trustee. Under the bankruptcy laws , 
any proposal to "use, sell, or lease" property that is outside of the 
"ordinary course of business" is subject to a hearing and "approval 
by a bankruptcy court."I� This suggests that a church could not 
start a substantial new soup kitchen ministry or close and sell a 
school during the bankruptcy case unless the bankruptcy judge _ 
gave it the go ahead. The court approval requirement skates quite 
close to the First Amendment line, and it is possible that a court 
would overturn a bankruptcy judge's veto in an extraordinary 
��I For further discussion of this conclusion, see Skeel, supra note 3, at 1194. 
Iii 11 U.s.c. § 1104. 
\J People v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1981). "How the state .. can control church property and the receipt and 
expenditure of church funds without necessarily becoming involved in the 
ecclesiastical funds of the church is difficult to conceive." Id. at 551 (describing the 
California legislation). 
�� 11 U.S.C.S. § 363(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). 
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case.
:U 
But several factors argue in favor of generally upholding 
the requirement that the bankruptcy court approve extraordinary 
transactions. First, the court's role is reactive; it simply approves 
or disapproves financial decisions, rather than initiating them. 
Perhaps more importantly, if the church felt particularly strongly 
about the decision in question, it could ask for its bankruptcy case 
to be dismissed.
3j 
Alternatively, if the church continued with the 
case, it could take the requested action after its reorganization 
plan was confirmed. 
IV. Confirmation Issues When the Parties Can't Get Along 
The final context where sovereignty concerns may 
signifi{:antlyalter the reorganization comes as the parties near the 
moment of truth, when the time comes to either approve or 
disapprove a proposed reorganization plan. Chapter 11 provides 
two extremely important "sticks" to move the process along, and 
to increase the likelihood that the parties will actually agree to a 
consensual reorganization plan. If the debtor is unreasonable, 
creditors can ask the court to convert the case from Chapter 11 to 
Chapter 7, which means appointing a trustee and selling off the 
assets.
3; 
If, on the other hand, a class of creditors is recalcitrant, a 
reorganization plan that doesn't fully compensate them can be 
"crammed down" over their objections so long as no lower priority 
creditors are paid anything.
:16 
In a sovereign bankruptcy, liquidation simply would not be a 
realistic option. Countries can't be shut down and their assets 
sold for the benefit of their creditors.
:;; 
Interestingly, the 
possibility of liquidating the assets of a church is easier to imagine 
- after all, churches are less tied to a physical location than cities 
and countries are - but lhe bankruptcy laws take this stick away 
from creditors by precluding creditors of a nonprofit corporation 
�� It is interesting to note in this regard that § 363 is not one of the provisions 
that is incorporated into Chapter 9. See] 1 U.S.C. § 901 (listing provisions from 
Chapters 3-11 that are included in Chapter 9). This omission presumably reflects a 
conclusion that § 363 oversight is inappropriate for a municipal debtor. 
31 Id. § 1112(b) (any party in interest can ask for dismissal "for cause"). 
3j Id. § 1122 (conversion to Chapter 7). 
3Ii Id. § 1129 (b) (cramdown) . 
37 It probably would not be realistic to shut down a municipality, either, although 
two commentators have suggested the possibility. McConnell & Picker, sujJ"l"(l note 9. 
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from asking the court to convert the case to Chapter 7.-
1' 
Only the 
debtor can seek conversion. As a result, the liquidation stick isn't 
available to focus the debtor's attention on striking a deal. 
The second stick, cramdown, is not ruled out altogether, but 
it too is an awkward fit if the debtor is a church or other sovereign 
entity. The initial problem is one of valuation: In order to 
determine whether higher priority creditors can be paid in full, it 
is often necessary for the court to determine the value of the 
debtor's assets. Valuation is difficult with an ordinary corporate -
debtor;
19 
the complexity of valuation, as well as related 
uncertainties, is magnified in the case of a sovereign debtor:
o 
The second difficulty is that cramdown in an ordinary 
bankruptcy case usually wipes out the debtor's shareholders, due 
to the relentless iogic of insolvency. If higher priority creditors 
must be paid in full before lower priority creditors and 
shareholders get anything, there won't be anything left over by the 
time we get to the shareholders if the company is insolvent. 
Wiping out the shareholders of a widely held, for-profit 
corporation is relatively straightforward, but it doesn't translate 
well into the sovereign context. Countries do not have 
shareholders; they have political leaders and citizens. A literal 
application of the cramdown principles seems to suggest that the 
sovereign's existing decision makers must be displaced, and their 
authority transferred to creditors or their representatives. As 
discussed in the last part, this is not somewhere bankruptcy can or 
should go. 
Notice where this leaves us. Taking away both liquidation 
and cram down would remove two of the key mechanisms that 
Chapter 11 provides to prod the parties toward agreement. If 
neither of the sticks is available, the risk that the negotiated 
3,� 1 1  U.s.c. § 1 1 l2 (c). 
�9 Bankruptcy lawyers long cited valuation difliculties as an important reason why 
consensual reorganization plans have traditionally been more common than 
cramdown plans_ See, e.g., David A. Skeel,]r., The Nature and Ef ect orCmporate Voting 
in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. RE,·. 461, 484 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki & 
William C. Whitford, Ba-rgaining Over Equity's Share in the Brmkmj)tcJ Remganization oj 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. P.-\. L. R.E". 125, 143-58 (1990). 
411 An important issue in municipal bankruptcies, for instance, is whether to take 
future tax revenues into account in deciding whether to confirm a proposed 
reorganization plan; similarly, in a church bankruptcy, it is not clear if future 
contributions from parishioners should be considered. 
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process will break down will be much higher than in an ordinary 
Chapter 11 case. The possibility of impasse is particularly 
worrisome in the church bankruptcy context, because dioceses 
generally have filed for bankruptcy only after efforts to resolve the 
cases brought by clergy misconduct victims collapse.
;' 
If the 
stalemate continues after the diocese files for bankruptcy, and 
bankruptcy's most important sticks are neutralized, the diocese 
may simply be unable to propose a confirmable reorganization 
plan. 
Is there any way out of this impasse? The solution that a few 
courts have used in cases involving nonprofit corporations is to 
apply a modified version of the cram down rule in order to avoid 
the issue of. whether the existing decision makers must be 
displaced. In a case involving a rural electric cooperative, the 
Seventh Circuit emphasized that the individuals who controlled 
the cooperative were not like ordinary shareholders, since they 
had no right to receive the profits of the cooperation.
;? 
Another 
court used similar reasoning with respect to individuals who had 
an interest in a nonprofit hospital that filed for bankruptcy.
;:1 
Both 
courts reasoned that the cramdown rule only applies to those who 
have a direct financial stake in the debtor.;; In a church 
bankruptcy, this reasoning would suggest that the absolute priority 
rule applies to creditors but not to the church officials who 
oversee the diocese. 
Unfortunately, actually applying this strategy in a church 
bankruptcy would put the bankruptcy court in a very difficult 
POSItIon. The churches that have filed for bankruptcy thus far 
have had only one real class of creditors, the vast damage claims of 
clergy malpractice victims. In effect, the cases boil down to two 
11 See, e.g., Stammer, sItjJm note 1, at 1 (quoting letter from Portland Archbishop 
Vlazny to parishioners about the diocese's bankruptcy filing, which stated that the 
'''pot of gold is pretty much empty now"'). 
1� In reWabash Valley Pt)wer Ass'n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995). 
1:1 In Fe Whittaker Mem'l Hasp. Ass'n, 149 B.R. 812 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). 
+I In In re Fasten1 Maine Electric CoojJerative, Inc., 125 RR. 329 (Bankr. D. Me. 
J991), a bankruptcy court held that the absolute priority rule did apply to members 
of the electric cooperative that filed for bankruptcy in that case, because the 
members' right to recover "patronage capital" made them similar to ordinal)' 
shareholders. For a brief, useful discussion of the cases, see Gary \tv. Marsh, Intensive 
Care: AjJjJlir:aliol1 of the Absolute Priority Rule to Non-Profit Entities, J 7-] AM. BANKR. fNST. J. 
18 (1998). 
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main parties, the church debtor and the class of tort claims. In 
practice, this means that the church's other creditors are likely to 
be paid in full, and the sticking point is simply how much to set 
aside for the misconduct victims. This is the class that may refuse 
to approve a proposed plan, and this is the class that may not be 
paid in full. As a result, in deciding whether to approve a 
proposed cram down plan, the bankruptcy judge would essentially 
be required to determine what the payout should be. This would 
require her to assess the value of the church's assets (possibly 
including the expected future contributions of parishioners) in 
order to decide whether to approve the plan. Rather than 
blessing or not blessing an agreement made by the parties, the 
judge would be required to pick sides, and in effect to determine 
the terms of the reorganization herself. 
Another tool that is available in an ordinary Chapter 1 1  case 
would lead to the same problems. If a debtor fails to propose a 
plan in a timely fashion, the bankruptcy judge can lift the so-called 
exclusivity period - the period during which the debtor is the only 
one who can propose a reorganization - and permit creditors to 
propose their own reorganization plan.�; If the victims ask the 
bankruptcy judge to take this step, and the judge agrees, the 
victims can propose their own cramdown plan, presumably with a 
more attractive proposed payout to the victims.iI) As with a church­
proposed cramdown, the bankruptcy judge would be forced to 
pick sides when it determined whether to approve the victim­
proposed cramdown. With a victim-proposed cramdown, the 
analysis would be complicated even further by the possibility that 
the payout requirements would effectively tie church leaders' 
hands going forward, and thus would risk running aground of 
First Amendment concerns. 
What, then, is a bankruptcy judge to do? If I were the judge, 
and I were forced to give a thumbs up or thumbs down on a 
cramdown plan proposed by the church, I would be extremely 
1, Under II U.S.c. § 11 21, only the debtor can file a plan for the first 1 20 days of 
the case, but courts can, and often do extend this exclusivity period. See 11 U.s.c. § 
1121 (d) (authorizing court to extend or reduce exclusivity period) . 
• Ii For an argument that the exclusivity period should routinely be ended in 
ordinary bankruptcy cases after a debtor proposes a cramdown plan that relies on so­
called "new value" contributions, see Bruce A. Markell, Owner:s, Auctions, and Absolute 
Priority in Bank'IUptcy Remganizations, 44 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1991). 
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reluctant to approve the plan. Given the awkward fit between 
proposals that leave the debtor's existing operations in place and 
the Chapter 1 1  cramduwn rules, and the difficulty of determining 
what an acceptable cramdown should look like, I would be 
inclined to reject any cramdown proposal about which there were 
any serious doubts. 
The best solution, in my view, would be to leave the issue 
open, and indeed to use the uncertainty to encourage the church 
and the victims to come to an agreement. A recent case in a very 
different context provides a nice analogy of how this might be 
don e. In the takeover battle between Oracle and PeopleSoft, 
Oracle brought suit in the Delaware Chancery Court asking the 
court to force PeopleSoft to remove its poison pill takeover 
defense. Although Delaware courts have never required a target 
like PeopleSoft, who has consistently rejected all takeover offers, 
to remove a poison pill, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine hinted that he 
just might take this step if the part ies failed to settle their 
differences. In the face of the uncertainty on both sides as to how 
the court would rule, Oracle eventually raised its bid and 
PeopleSoft agreed to the takeover. n 
In the .church bankruptcy context, the judge may be able to 
achieve a similar effect by leaving open both the possibility of a 
cramdown bid, and the possibility that she might permit creditors 
to propose a reorganization plan if the church drags its feet. This 
uncertainty isn 't a perfect substitute for the liquidation and 
cramdown options in an ordinary bankruptcy case, but it could 
help discourage both sides from digging in their heels and taking 
unreasonable positions. 
V. Conclusion 
Chapter 11 IS an av,Tkward fit for financially troubled 
sovereign entItles. Its provisions> are designed "vith financial 
considerations and for profi t entities in mind, not for entities 
whose principal purpose is political or religious. Given this 
divergence of focus, it is hardly surprising that Chapter 11 does 
4; SI!f', e.g. , !vlaureen O'Gara, Judge Wants PeojJleSojt to E:>.jJLain Why It Turned Orade 
Down, . JREPORT (Nov. 25, 2(04 ) ,  available at http ://java.sys-con.com/ l-ead/ 
47207 _p .htm.  
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not provide answers for many of the questions that arise when a 
sovereign entity encounters financial distress. This article has 
considered a series of issues that seem to fall between the cracks in 
one way or another, including the question of who owns church 
property; the tension between Chapter 1 1  oversight, on the one 
hand, and sovereignty or religious freedom concerns , on the 
other; and the difficulty of prodding the parties to agreement in a 
church bankruptcy case. In each of these contexts, I have 
suggested that the bankruptcy court will  often be better off leaving 
the issues unresolved, and impressing upon the parties the interest 
they have in negotiating to a consensual solution. 
By focusing on a series of difficult issues, I don 't mean to 
suggest that bankruptcy is an ineffective mechanism for resolving 
the financial distress of sovereign entities. Despite the difficulties, 
the basic structure of Chapter 1 1  (and Chapter 9) works 
surprisingly well in this context. Churchill 's famous statement 
about democracy seems equally true as a description of the 
negotiated Chapter 11 process: It's the worst system imaginable 
for dealing with a church or other sovereign bankruptcy, except 
for all the rest. 
